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INDEMNIFYING PUBLIC EMPLOYEES AGAINST 
JUDGMENTS FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES:           
THE NEW MEXICO TORT CLAIMS ACT IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
 
Matthew Holt* 
I. PROLOGUE 
Veteran police officer Michael Garcia undertook to protect and serve.1 
Instead, he took advantage of his position as a police officer, and violated a young 
woman. D.G. was a 17-year- old high school student, going on a ride-along program 
with a police detective. Garcia and D.G. had been at the scene of a crime together, 
after which he said he was taking her back to the police station. Instead, he took her 
to a deserted area, and coerced her to perform a sexual act on him, and then digitally 
penetrated her. 
D.G. filed suit against Garcia, who then demanded that the governmental 
entity that employed him provide him with a defense and indemnify him.2 While 
D.G.’s claim for compensatory damages was significant, a huge portion of the claim 
concerned itself with the potential award of punitive damages. The New Mexico Tort 
Claims Act requires governmental entities to defend and indemnify an employee for 
claims arising out of acts or omissions occasioned in the “scope of his duty,” 
including awards of punitive damages.3 Fearful of a significant award of punitive 
damages, the governmental entity spent $3,000,000 of taxpayers’ money to settle the 
claim against Garcia.4 
 
 *  Assistant Professor at New Mexico State University, College of Business. 
 1. According to the Los Angeles Police Department’s website, in 1955, Beat Magazine held a 
contest to find a motto for the Los Angeles Police Department. Officer Joseph S. Dorobek suggested “to 
protect and serve” as the winning entry. The motto became the unofficial motto of the LAPD, growing in 
use until 1963, when the Los Angeles City Council passed an ordinance adopting it as the LAPD’s official 
motto, and it was placed alongside the City Seal on the Department’s patrol cars. The Origins of the LAPD 
Motto, LAPD, http://www.lapdonline.org/history_of_the_lapd/content_basic_view/1128 (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2017) (reprinting the story from Beat Magazine’s December 1963 issue). The motto is firmly 
embedded in New Mexico police culture to the point that, without reference to authority, the New Mexico 
Court of Appeals has noted that police officers have a duty to protect and serve, even when they are not 
on duty. See Schultz v. Pojoaque Tribal Police Dep’t, 2014-NMCA-019, ¶ 21, 317 P.3d 866. 
 2. See Answer for Petitioner, ¶ 5, Risk Mgmt. Div. v. McBrayer, 2000-NMCA-104, 14 P.3d 43 (No. 
D-307-CV-971754). 
 3. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-4(B)–(C) (2001). 
 4. Yanan Wang, Behind $3M Settlement, the Story of a Police Intern’s Dreams Shattered by Sexual 
Assault, WASH. POST (March 24, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016
/03/24/behind-3m-settlement-the-story-of-a-police-interns-dreams-shattered-by-sexual-assault/. 
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II. INTRODUCTION 
The New Mexico Tort Claims Act (TCA) was adopted both to limit the 
liability of the government, in order to protect the public treasury, and to provide for 
reasonable compensation to people who have been injured by wrongful acts of the 
government and its employees.5 However, a particular area of the TCA neither 
decreases the government’s liability nor provides for the payment of compensation 
to those injured by the government’s wrongful acts. In fact, in this area, the TCA 
increases the government’s liability. 
The TCA provides that the government is obligated both to defend and 
indemnify employees who are subject to claims for compensatory and punitive 
damages, provided only that the claims arise out of the employees’ conduct in the 
“scope of the duties” tasked to the employees.6 More than 15 years ago, the New 
Mexico Court of Appeals held that conduct that is purely personal, indeed conduct 
that may be heinously felonious, conduct that does not in any way advance the 
interests of the government, can be within a public employee’s “scope of duties” if 
the authorized duties assigned to the employee put him or her in the position so that 
they could commit the crime. 
In such a case, the governmental entity has the duty both to defend and to 
indemnify the employee. While punitive damages are not available against a 
government employee for a common law tort, they are available for a constitutional 
tort – and the TCA requires that the governmental entity indemnify the employee for 
both compensatory and punitive damages.7 
Because requiring the government to pay for punitive damages assessed 
against a public employee for purely personal conduct that falls with the “scope of 
duties” serves no public purpose, this Article argues that using taxpayer money to 
pay such an award violates the anti-donation clause of the New Mexico Constitution. 
III. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE NEW MEXICO TORT CLAIMS 
ACT 
a. An Abbreviated History of Sovereign Immunity8 
Sovereign immunity is the principle that the government itself cannot be 
sued without its consent.9 Elements of flourished in England, thus becoming a core 
principal in English common law.10 
 
 5. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-2(A) (1976); Ruth L. Kovnat, Torts: Sovereign and Governmental 
Immunity in New Mexico, 6 N.M. L. Rev. 249, 261–62 (1976). 
 6. § 41-4-4(B)–(C). 
 7. Loya v. Gutierrez, 2015-NMSC-017, ¶¶ 44–47, 350 P.2d 1155. 
 8. The history in this section is adapted from Jaime McAlister, The New Mexico Tort Claims Act: 
The King Can Do “Little” Wrong, 21 N.M. L. Rev. 441, 442–44 (1991). 
 9.  Dougherty v. Vidal, 1933-NMSC-034, ¶ 6, 21 P.2d 90 (quoting State ex. rel. Evans v. Field, 
1921-NMSC-082, ¶ 6, 201 P. 1059). 
 10. Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359, 362 (1788) (“[I]t is better that an individual should 
sustain an injury than that the public should suffer an inconvenience.”). The original source of the doctrine 
of sovereign immunity is unclear. Some claim that it finds its roots in ancient Roman law (See Edwin M 
Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, IV, 36 Yale L. J. 1, 3 (1926)), while other claim that 
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The doctrine of sovereign immunity came to the United States with the rest 
of English common law.11 While the ancient precedents of sovereign immunity seem 
to stem from the idea that the kings of years bygone were anointed by God, and 
therefore it was impossible for a king to do anything wrong, later cases embraced 
sovereign immunity on the grounds that the king was the highest authority in the 
land, and to allow a court to exercise jurisdiction over him would usurp his 
authority.12 That logic, of course, had no place in American jurisprudence, as the 
Constitution put the three branches of our government on somewhat even footing. 
Justice Holmes explained the American rationale for sovereign immunity: “A 
sovereign is exempt . . . on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal 
right as against the authority that makes the law on which that right depends.”13 
While sovereign immunity was the unquestioned norm for years, courts 
eventually began to question the unblinking adherence to this ancient doctrine. 
Beginning in the 1960s, courts across the country began to reject the notion of 
sovereign immunity, finding that it had no place in modern society.14 
The death knell for traditional sovereign immunity in New Mexico was 
sounded in 1975, in Hicks v. State,15 when the New Mexico Supreme Court rejected 
the doctrine as “archaic” and stated that there were “no conditions or circumstances 
which could rationally support” the continuation of sovereign immunity.16 The court 
ruled that the doctrine of sovereign immunity had been created by the courts, and 
could therefore be abolished by the courts.17 Of course, the court could only abolish 
the immunities which the Judiciary had created, and it would be less than a year 
before judicial sovereign immunity would be replaced in New Mexico with a much 
more limited form of statutory immunity. 
b. The Adoption of the Tort Claims Act 
The decision in Hicks was issued on September 26, 1975. The New Mexico 
legislature met the following January in regular session, and adopted the (TCA).18 
The TCA begins with a legislative declaration that the strict application of the 
 
notion has been debunked (G. Pugh, Historical Approach to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, 13 La. 
L. Rev. 476, 477 (1953)). 
 11. Early on, there seemed to be some debate as to whether American had embraced the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity. See Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 341 (1879), which pointed out that the 
maxim that “the king could do no wrong” would not be embraced in America. But, over time, it became 
clear that the doctrine of sovereign immunity had firmly taken root in the United States. See Kawananakoa 
v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907). 
 12. Verne Lawyer, Birth and Death of Government of Immunity, 15 CLEV. MARSHALL L. REV. 529 
(1966). 
 13. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907). 
 14. See Stone v. Ariz. Highway Comm’n, 381 P.2d 107, 113 (Ariz. 1963); Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. 
Dist., 359 P.2d 457, 463 (Cal. 1961); Evans v. Board of Cty. Comm’r, 482 P.2d 968, 972 (Colo. 1971); 
Perkins v. State, 251 N.E.2d 30, 35 (Ind. 1969); Carroll v. Kittle, 457 P.2d 21, 29 (Kan. 1969); Haney v. 
City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738, 742 (Ky. 1964); Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, 118 
N.W.2d 795 (Minn. 1962); Holytz v. Milwaukee, 115 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Wis. 1962). 
 15. Hicks v. State, 1975-NMSC-056, ¶ 13, 544 P.2d 1153. 
 16. Id. ¶ 8. 
 17. Id. ¶ 9. 
 18. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-1 to 30 (1975, as amended through 2015). 
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doctrine of sovereign immunity can lead to unfair and inequitable results, but also 
recognizes that government should not have a duty to do everything that can be done 
to promote the public good.19 The TCA states that governmental entities and public 
employees shall only be liable within the limitations set forth in the TCA.20 
The TCA provides that governmental entities and public employees shall 
be immune from tort claims except as provided in the Act, which waives immunity 
for a wide variety of torts.21 It creates procedural mechanisms that require claimants 
to give notice of potential claims against governmental entities,22 provides for a 
shorter statute of limitations,23 and sets a limit on the amount of damages that can be 
recovered.24 
c. A Review of the Relevant Portions of the Tort Claims Act 
The TCA, of course, provides limited immunities only for tort claims 
brought in New Mexico. It does not immunize governmental entities or public 
employees for wrongs that are actionable under the laws of another jurisdiction.25 
Under the TCA, a governmental entity must defend and indemnify a public 
employee against any claim alleging any tort or violation of the right, privileges or 
immunities secured by the constitution and laws of the United States or of New 
Mexico if the wrongful act was alleged to have been committed by the public 
employee “while acting within the scope of his duty.”26 Importantly, the TCA 
requires the governmental entity to “pay any award for punitive or exemplary 
damages awarded against a public employee . . . if the public employee was acting 
within the scope of his duty.”27 Under this provision, the State’s duty to defend and 
indemnify its employees, and its duty to pay for punitive or exemplary damages, are 
only triggered if the public employee’s acts occurred “within the scope of his duty.” 
 
 19. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-2 (1976). 
 20. Id. 
 21. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-4(A) (2001). 
 22. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-16 (1977). 
 23. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-15 (1977). 
 24. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-19 (2007). 
 25. See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 490 (2003). A foreign jurisdiction, called 
upon to adjudicate a tort claim against the State of New Mexico, one of its political subdivisions, or one 
of its public employees, is not compelled to honor the immunities and protections created by the Tort 
Claims Act, but can extend those protections under the principle of comity, as long as extending those 
protections would not violate the foreign jurisdiction’s legitimate public policies. See id. at 497, 499; cf. 
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 426–27 (1979). In the same vein, New Mexico courts will apply the 
immunity provisions of a foreign state’s law where appropriate. See Sam v. Estate of Sam, 2006-NMSC-
022, ¶ 1, 134 P.3d 761. 
 26. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-4(D) (2001). 
 27. Id. § 41-4-4(C). The Tort Claims Act does not allow for an award of punitive damages against 
either the government or against a public employee, but the prohibition only applies to conventional tort 
claims. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-19(D) (2007). Where a claim is brought against either the 
government or against one of its employees under the laws of a foreign jurisdiction, the statutory 
proscription against punitive damages has no application. § 41-4-4(C). 
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IV. THE SOURCE OF THE PROBLEM:                                               
RISK MANAGEMENT DIVISION V. MCBRAYER28 
Jennifer McBrayer, a student at New Mexico State University, missed 
several assignments in her English class.29 She wrote a note to her instructor, asking 
that she be allowed to make up the assignments.30 Her instructor told McBrayer that 
she could go with him to his off-campus apartment and pick up her assignments and 
she agreed.31 
McBrayer accompanied the instructor to his apartment and waited in the 
front doorway while he went to look for them inside.32 He returned with the papers 
– and with a stun gun.33 After a brief struggle, he forced McBrayer into his apartment, 
where he tortured and raped her.34 She was finally able to escape, and her instructor 
was later arrested, charged, and tried on various felony charges.35 He was ultimately 
convicted of kidnapping, criminal sexual penetration, attempted murder and criminal 
sexual contact, and was sentenced to fifty nine and one-half years in prison.36 
McBrayer then sued her instructor, alleging that he committed the heinous 
attack on her “under color of state law.”37 Her instructor—employed by a public 
university—claimed that the State had a duty to defend and to indemnify him.38 The 
State Risk Management Division filed a petition for declaratory judgment, asking 
that the court determine “whether it had to defend or pay damages in McBrayer’s 
lawsuit.”39 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Risk Management, 
and McBrayer appealed.40 
The Court of Appeals noted that Risk Management had a duty to defend the 
instructor, and to pay any judgment or settlement against him, if he committed the 
acts “while acting within the scope of his duties.”41 The court referred to this “as a 
kind of statutory insurance.”42 The reference to statutory insurance is apt, and 
intriguing, and warrants a brief detour from the discussion of McBrayer. 
 
 
 
 28. Risk Mgmt. Div. v. McBrayer, 2000-NMCA-104, 14 P.3d 43. 
 29. Id. ¶ 3. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. ¶ 4. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. ¶ 5. 
 38. See Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Supplemental Relief ¶ 7, Risk Mgmt. Div. v. 
McBrayer, 2000-NMCA-104, 14 P.3d 43 (No. D-307-CV-971754); see also Answer of Defendant 
Eduardo Araiza to Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Supplemental Relief ¶ 5, Risk Mgmt. Div. v. 
McBrayer, 2000-NMCA-104, 14 P.3d 43 (No. D-307-CV-971754). 
 39. McBrayer, 2000-NMCA-104, ¶ 5. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. ¶ 6. 
 42. Id. 
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A brief detour to discuss insurance for Punitive Damages, and the New 
Mexico Supreme Court’s Accompanying Misinterpretation of the 
Tort Claims Act 
Courts across the country are split as to whether insurance should be 
allowed to pay for punitive damages. Perhaps the most frequently cited case to 
support the argument that public policy prohibits insurance from paying an award of 
punitive damages is Northwestern National Casualty Co. v. McNulty, where the 
court reasoned thus: 
Where a person is able to insure himself against punishment he 
gains a freedom of misconduct inconsistent with the establishment 
of sanctions against such misconduct. It is not disputed that 
insurance against criminal fines or penalties will be void as 
violative of public policy. The same public policy should 
invalidate any contract of insurance against the civil punishment 
that punitive damages represent. 
 
The policy considerations in a state where, as in Florida and 
Virginia, punitive damages are awarded for punishment and 
deterrence, would seem to require that the damages rest ultimately 
as well as nominally on the party actually responsible for the 
wrong. If that person were permitted to shift the burden to an 
insurance company, punitive damages would serve no useful 
purpose. Such damages do not compensate the plaintiff for his 
injury, since compensatory damages already have made the 
plaintiff whole. And there is no point in punishing the insurance 
company; it has done no wrong. In actual fact, of course, and 
considering the extent to which the public is insured, the burden 
would ultimately come to rest not on the insurance companies but 
on the public, since the added liability to the insurance companies 
would be passed along to the premium payers. Society would then 
be punishing itself for the wrong committed by the insured.43 
Other courts, however, allow insurance policies to cover punitive damages 
for a variety of reasons. Arguments for allowing insurance policies to cover punitive 
damages include: (1) allowing the insurer to pay punitive damages does not dilute 
the punitive effect of the award, because the insurer can then sue the insured for 
reimbursement of those damages;44 (2) other punitive measures, such as criminal 
sanctions, are often available against the defendant, and these can act as a deterrent, 
rather than relying on punitive damages;45 (3) the person insured against punitive 
damages would still feel the sting of the award because after an insurance company 
paid the award, the insured’s premiums would soar;46 (4) there is a fine line between 
negligence and gross negligence, and therefore insurance coverage for gross 
 
 43. Northwestern Nat’l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 440–41 (5th Cir. 1962). 
 44. Baker v. Armstrong, 1987-NMSC-101, ¶ 10, 744 P.2d 170. 
 45. Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 383 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tenn. 1964). 
 46. Price v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 502 P.2d 522, 524 (Ariz. 1972). 
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negligence—but not for intentional misconduct—should be allowed; and47 (5) the 
public policy reasons against insuring for punitive damages are outweighed by the 
public policy in favor of enforcing insurance contracts that cover punitive damages.48 
New Mexico allows insurance coverage for punitive damages.49 In Baker v. 
Armstrong,50 one of the first New Mexico cases to allow insurance coverage for 
punitive damages, the court, as part of its rationale, cited the Tort Claims Act as 
evidence that public policy allowed an insurer to pay an award of punitive damages: 
“Furthermore, under the tort claims act, a governmental entity is required to pay any 
punitive damages awarded against a public employee acting within the scope of his 
duty and not acting fraudulently or with actual intentional malice.”51 
The Baker court, however, was mistaken in its understanding of the TCA. 
The language quoted above implies that the governmental entity need not pay 
punitive damages if the public employee was acting fraudulently or with malicious 
intent. When the TCA was first passed, it made no mention of indemnification for 
punitive damages, regardless of fraudulent or malicious intent.52 Rather, the TCA 
provided that the government should generally indemnify a public employee for tort 
liability arising out of conduct that was occasioned in the scope of the employee’s 
duties, but expressly provided that the employee should be personally liable if the 
employee acted “maliciously, fraudulently, or without just cause.”53 
Two years later, the TCA was amended. Rather than providing that an 
employee would be personally liable if he acted maliciously, fraudulently, or without 
just cause, the amended TCA provided that the government would pay the entire 
award, but could seek reimbursement for any payment from the employee if the 
liability resulted from conduct that was malicious, fraudulent, or without just cause.54 
The TCA was again amended in 1982, to expressly provide that the 
governmental entity would pay any award of punitive damages against a public 
employee, though the governmental entity could seek reimburse of such payment (as 
well as the payment of defense costs and payment of compensatory damages) from 
an employee who acted maliciously, fraudulently, or without just cause.55 
This was the state of the law in 1987, when Baker v. Armstrong was 
decided. The governmental entity’s obligation to pay punitive damages was 
dependent only on a finding that the public employee had acted in the scope of his 
duties. The governmental entity was not able to avoid paying such an award of 
punitive damages simply because the “public employee was acting fraudulent[ly] or 
with actual intentional malice.” Thus, in referencing the Tort Claims Act to 
determine whether insurance coverage could apply to punitive damages, the Baker 
 
 47. See Abbie Uriguen Oldsmobile Buick v. U. S. Fire Ins. Co., 511 P.2d 783, 787 (Idaho 1973); 
Continental Ins. v. Hancock, 507 S.W.2d 146, 151–52 (Ky. 1973). 
 48. See Price v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 502 P.2d 522, 524 (Ariz. 1972); Greenwood 
Cemetery v. Travelers Indem. Co., 232 S.E.2d 910, 914 (Ga. 1976). 
 49. See Baker v. Armstrong, 1987-NMSC-101, ¶ 16, 744 P.2d 170. 
 50. 1987-NMSC-101, 744 P.2d 170. 
 51. Id. ¶ 8. 
 52. See 1976 N.M. Laws 159. 
 53. Id. 
 54. 1978 N.M. Laws 1028–29. 
 55. 1982 N.M. Laws 126. 
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court misinterpreted the TCA as allowing the government to avoid paying punitive 
damages when public employees acted fraudulently or with actual malice. 
Returning to McBrayer 
The issue before the New Mexico Court of Appeals in McBrayer was 
whether the New Mexico State instructor was acting within the scope of his duties 
when he tortured and raped McBrayer, pursuant to the TCA’s definition of “scope 
of duties.” The Court of Appeals noted that the legislature chose not to use the phrase 
“scope of employment,” but instead to use the phrase “scope of duty.”56 The TCA 
provides a brief definition of the phrase: 
Scope of duty means performing any duties that a public employee is 
requested, required or authorized to perform by the governmental entity, regardless 
of the time and place of performance . . . .57 
The Risk Management Division argued that the University had not 
“requested, required or authorized” the assault on Ms. McBrayer, and therefore the 
instructor was not acting in the scope of his duty to the University.58 The Court of 
Appeals, however, noted that it could not just read the definition of scope of duty 
provided in the TCA, but was instead compelled to read the entire TCA together, in 
order to provide context.59 
As noted above, the TCA requires the government to pay any judgment 
against an employee, including punitive damages, if the claim is based on conduct 
of a public employee acting in the scope of his duties.60 The TCA also provides that 
if the award of damages is the result of the public employee’s fraudulent or malicious 
conduct resulting in bodily injury, property damage, or death, then the governmental 
entity that paid the judgment may seek to recover the amount paid from the public 
employee.61 
Based upon this language, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the TCA 
intended to require the government to pay a judgment when the public employee was 
acting within the scope of his duty, even when acting either fraudulently or with 
actual malice.62 Therefore, the Court reasoned, the TCA anticipates that an employee 
can be acting in the scope of his duties even though he was acting fraudulently and/or 
with actual malice:63 
The language of these indemnification sections does not exclude 
criminal conduct from an employee’s scope of duty. For example, 
an employee whose intentional malice caused bodily injury may 
 
 56. Risk Mgmt. Div. v. McBrayer, 2000-NMCA-104, ¶ 8, 14 P.3d 43. 
 57. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-3(G) (2015). 
 58. McBrayer, 2000-NMCA-104, ¶ 10. 
 59. Id. ¶ 11. 
 60. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-4(B)-(C) (2015). 
 61. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-4(E) (2015). 
 62. McBrayer, 2000-NMCA-104, ¶¶ 13, 22. 
 63. Id. ¶ 12. The Court also noted that the TCA provides coverage for punitive or exemplary damages 
in civil rights cases when the public employee acts in the scope of duty. Since punitive damages can only 
be awarded when the public employee’s conduct was malicious, willful, reckless, wanton, fraudulent, or 
in bad faith, it must be that the TCA was intended to provide coverage for such conduct. Id. ¶¶13–14. 
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be guilty of battery . . . an employee whose intentional malice 
results in property damages may be guilty of a trespass . . . and, 
conceivably, an employee whose intentional malice results in a 
wrongful death may be guilty of murder. 
The Court of Appeals ultimately reasoned that the legislature anticipated 
that a public employee might “abuse the duties actually requested, required or 
authorized . . . and thereby commit malicious, even criminal acts that were 
unauthorized, yet incidental to the performance of those duties.”64 
The Court of Appeals then focused on the attack on McBrayer: 
[The assault came about] through [the instructor’s] duty as a 
university instructor to distribute homework assignments. Because 
it appears that [the instructor] used this authorized duty as a 
subterfuge to accomplish his assault, we find that a reasonable fact 
finder could determine that his actions were within the scope of 
his duties that NMSU requested, required or authorized him to 
perform. After all, the TCA defines “scope of duties” as 
“performing any duties [, not acts] that a public employee is 
requested, required or authorized to perform.” . . . It is the duty, 
not the tortious or criminal act, that triggers the state’s obligations 
under [the TCA].65 
The decision in McBrayer discussed Risk Management’s potential obligation to pay 
any award or settlement of “damages,” without differentiating between the payment 
of compensatory and punitive damages.66 But since the government has a duty to pay 
awards of both compensatory and punitive damages rendered against a public 
employee for conduct committed in the “scope of duty,” if Risk Management had a 
duty to pay an award of compensatory damages to McBrayer, it also had a duty to 
pay any award of punitive damages. 
The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the district court for further 
proceedings, which would allow the finder of fact to determine if the instructor was 
acting within the scope of his duties.67 
The New Mexico Supreme Court refused to grant a writ of certiorari in the 
McBrayer case.68 Before the trial court had a chance determine if the instructor was 
acting within the scope of his duties, however, the case was settled.69 The lawsuit 
against the instructor, and the declaratory judgment action filed the by Risk 
Management Division, were voluntarily dismissed.70 
 
 64. Id. ¶ 17. 
 65. Id. ¶ 20. 
 66. Id. passim. 
 67. Id. ¶ 30. 
 68. Risk Mgmt. Div. v. McBrayer, 16 P.3d 442 (Table) (2000). 
 69. See Email to Judge Robles dated August 16, 2001, attached to Motion to Extend Deadlines, Risk 
Mgmt. Div. v. McBrayer, 2000-NMCA-104, 14 P.3d 43 (No. D-307-CV-971754). 
 70. Order of Dismissal, Risk Mgmt. Div. v. McBrayer, 2000-NMCA-104, 14 P.3d 43 (No. D-307-
CV-971754); Order of Dismissal with Prejudice, Risk Mgmt. Div. v. McBrayer, 2000-NMCA-104, 14 
P.3d 43 (No. D-307-CV-971754). 
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The Court of Appeals’ decision has been cited in more than a score of cases, 
in both state and federal court, and continues to be the law of the land. The net effect 
of McBrayer is that an employee may commit a criminal act for his own benefit, 
resulting not only in an award of compensatory damages to his victim, but an award 
of punitive damages, and the taxpayers of New Mexico will have to pay that award 
if the circumstances that allowed the criminal act found their origin in the employee’s 
work for a governmental entity. 
The Court of Appeals’ decision in McBrayer was embraced by the New 
Mexico Supreme Court in Celaya v. Hall.71 Hall, a volunteer chaplain with the 
Bernalillo County Sheriff’s Department, ran over Celaya’s foot in the parking lot of 
Wal-Mart. Hall was at Wal-Mart on a personal errand, driving an unmarked vehicle 
provided by the Sheriff’s office.72 He could not recall what he was doing immediately 
before going to Wal-Mart, but testified that he customarily drove the Department’s 
vehicle only in connection with his official chaplain duties.73 
Plaintiff filed suit almost three years after the incident. While there is a 
three-year statute of limitations for personal injuries,74 the TCA has a two-year 
statute of limitations.75 Therefore, if Hall was acting “in the scope of his duties,” the 
claim would be barred by the TCA’s two-year statute of limitations. The trial court 
found that Hall was acting in the scope of his duties, and therefore granted summary 
judgment in his favor.76 The plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed 
the decision of the trial court.77 The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari.78 
In discussing whether Hall was acting in the scope of his duties, the 
Supreme Court relied on, and quoted from, the decision in McBrayer. For example, 
it quoted McBrayer for the proposition that, in adopting the phrase “scope of duties,” 
the legislature “created and defined a unique standard to be applied to TCA claims 
based upon acts of public employees.”79 The Ceyala court also drew on another 
decision by the Court of Appeals, the case of Medina v. Fuller.80 The defendant in 
Medina, a deputy sheriff, was driving a departmental vehicle home from work when 
she stopped for a personal errand, and was involved in an accident. The deputy was 
on-call, and she was authorized to drive the departmental vehicle to and from work. 
81 Reasoning that the deputy’s continuous use of the vehicle was for the benefit of 
the sheriff’s department, and that her use of the vehicle was “permitted, if not 
required” by her employer—a governmental entity—the Court of Appeals concluded 
that her use of the vehicle was “within the literal definition of [her] ‘scope of 
duties.’”82 
 
 71. 2004-NMSC-005, ¶ 22, 85 P.3d 239. 
 72. Id. ¶ 2. 
 73. Id. ¶¶ 3–4. 
 74. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-8 (2015). 
 75. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-15 (2015). 
 76. Celaya, 2004-NMSC-005, ¶ 6. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. ¶ 22 (quoting Risk Mgmt. Div. v. McBrayer, 2000-NMCA-104, ¶ 8, 14 P.3d 43). 
 80. See id. ¶¶ 22, 23, 26 (discussing Medina v. Fuller, 1999-NMCA-011, 971 P.2d 851). 
 81. Medina, 1990-NMCA-11, ¶¶ 5, 7. 
 82. See id. ¶¶ 11–12. 
328 NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW Vol. 47; No. 1 
 After discussing McBrayer and Medina, the Court in Ceyala reasoned that 
an employee is within the scope of his or her duties whenever there is “a connection 
between the public employee’s actions at the time of the incident and the duties the 
public employee was ‘requested, required or authorized’ to perform.”83 The Court 
noted that while Hall was unable to remember exactly what he was doing before the 
incident, he testified that he drove the governmental vehicle only when he was 
performing his duties as the department’s chaplain.84 In an affidavit submitted to the 
court, Hall testified that he “would occasionally stop in a store and run a personal 
errand on the way to or from a chaplain assignment,” but that he “never drove the 
vehicle exclusively for [his] own personal use.”85 The Court reasoned that since Hall 
“never drove his Department vehicle exclusively for personal use, and because he 
was driving it at the time of the incident, then he must have been coming from a 
‘chaplain assignment’ when he stopped off at Wal-Mart.”86 Thus, the court reasoned, 
a jury could find that he was acting in the scope of his duties, and reversed the grant 
of summary judgment. 
The decisions in McBrayer, Medina and Ceyala illustrate that a government 
employee can be in the “scope of his duties,” and thus can create vicarious liability 
for his government employer (and by extension, for the taxpayers which fund that 
governmental entity) not just when the employee is in the scope of employment,87 
but even when engaging in criminal acts88 that are not for the benefit of the 
government entity. 
V. A GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY SHOULD NOT HAVE TO PAY 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
a. The Law Governing an Award of Punitive Damages 
An award of punitive damages is for the “limited purpose of punishment 
and to deter others from the commission of like offenses.”89 A culpable mental state 
is therefore required.90 An award of punitive damages can be made only if the 
 
 83. Ceyala, 2004-NMSC-005, ¶ 26 (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41–4–3(G) (2015)). 
 84. Id. ¶ 27. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. The doctrine of respondeat superior imposes vicarious liability on an employer for the torts of 
its employees when they are committed in the “course and scope” of employment. See Spurlock v. 
Townes, 2016-NMSC-014, ¶¶ 12–13, 368 P.3d 1213. An act is in the “course and scope” of employment 
if (1) the act was fairly and naturally incidental to the employer’s business and (2) it was committed by 
the employee “with the view of furthering the employer’s interest.” N.M. CIV. U.J.I. 13-407. If the 
employee’s conduct arises from some external, independent and personal motive, it is not in the “course 
and scope” of employment. That means that – generally - an employee who intentionally injures another 
person is acting outside of the scope of their employment. See Ocana v. Am. Furniture Co., 2004-NMSC-
018, ¶ 29, 91 P.3d 58. 
 88. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 229 (AM. LAW. INST. 1958), outlines the criteria that 
a court should consider in determining whether an act is within the scope of employment. The last criterion 
asks that the court consider whether the act is “seriously criminal.” 
 89. N.M. CIV. U.J.I. 13-1827. 
 90. See Sloan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2004-NMSC-004, ¶ 23, 85 P.3d 230. 
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defendant acted maliciously, willfully, recklessly, wantonly, fraudulently, or in bad 
faith.91 
Since punitive damages are intended to punish—and not to compensate—
commentators have recognized that “[t]he concept of punitive damages lies in the 
borderland that both bridges and separates criminal law and torts.”92 Punitive 
damages may be appropriate in certain cases because the criminal law does not 
always adequately punish the wrongdoer.93 “Therefore, punitive damages are 
necessary and useful to serve the dual purposes of the criminal law: the punishment 
and deterrence of unacceptable conduct.”94 
Punitive damages do not compensate a victim of a crime that the public 
employee may have committed. The victim is compensated by an award of 
compensatory damages. The award of punitive damages is, instead, to punish and to 
deter. Therefore, in determining whether the government is benefitted by paying 
punitive damages, the focus therefore should not be on the victim. 
b. Requiring a Governmental Entity to Pay Punitive Damages Serves No 
Purpose 
Courts have clearly and unequivocally ruled that governments are not 
benefitted by paying punitive damages. These cases certainly did not arise in the 
context of claims for the indemnification of punitive damages, but in determining 
whether the government can be—and should be—held directly liable for punitive 
damages. 
The seminal case on this issue is Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.,95 where 
the United States Supreme Court discussed the fact that, historically, courts have 
always recognized that a governmental entity should not have to pay punitive 
damages, reasoning that requiring a government to pay punitive damages serves no 
purpose.96 The Newport court reasoned that punitive damages awards against a 
government were against public policy, “because such awards would burden the very 
taxpayers and citizens for whose benefit the wrongdoer was being chastised.”97 
 
 91. N.M. CIV. U.J.I. 13-1827. 
 92. Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1, 2 (1982); accord, see Bradley D. Toney, The Chaotic and Uncertain Due Process Challenge to Punitive 
Damages, 30 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 635 (1994). 
 93. Nicholas K. Kile, Constitutional Defenses Against Punitive Damages: Down but not out, 65 IND. 
L.J. 141 (1989). Although recognizing that punitive damages serve the same purpose as the criminal law, 
courts have been quick to point out that punitive damages are not a criminal sanction, and therefore the 
Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on double jeopardy is not violated when someone is both sentenced to 
prison and held liable for punitive damages in a civil lawsuit. See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 
103 (1997). 
 94. Kile, supra note 93, at 143. 
 95. 453 U.S. 247 (1981). 
 96. Id. at 267. 
 97. Id. at 263. While holding that the government could not be held directly liable for punitive 
damages, the Court acknowledged that some state statutes authorized the indemnification of punitive 
damages, though noting that a number of those statutes “specifically exclude indemnification for 
malicious or willful misconduct of the employees.” Id. at 269, n.30. A small handful of courts have, since 
that time, held that such indemnification does not conflict with the governmental body’s immunity granted 
by Newport. See, e.g., Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984), overruled by Russ v. 
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The New Mexico Supreme Court has echoed this sentiment repeatedly. In 
Torrance County Mental Health Program v. New Mexico Health & Environment 
Department,98 the Supreme Court considered whether punitive damages could be 
recovered from the State for a bad-faith breach of contract.99 The Court noted that 
while the TCA precluded an award of punitive damages for tort claims, a comparable 
statute concerning contract claims was silent as to punitive damages. The Court 
balanced competing interests: 1) deterring the abuse of governmental power and 
promoting accountability of governmental offices, and 2) protecting public revenues 
and the injustice of punishing innocent taxpayers rather than the officials at fault.100 
The court found that the balance was to be struck by not awarding punitive damages 
against the government. The court specifically noted that such an award served only 
as a windfall to the plaintiff.  
c. Punitive Damages Cannot Be Awarded Against a Governmental Entity 
The New Mexico Legislature seems to agree that punitive damages should 
not be paid by the taxpayers. The TCA expressly provides that punitive damages 
may not be awarded against the State or against any of its political subdivisions, for 
any tort for which immunity has been waived.101 
In addition, the United States Supreme Court has held that punitive damages 
cannot be awarded against a governmental entity, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.102 The 
Supreme Court’s rationale for not awarding punitive damages against a government 
is that punitive damages are not intended to compensate, but to punish the tortfeasor 
and to deter others from similar conduct.103 Since punitive damages are—as the name 
 
Watts, 414 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2005); Cornwell v. City of Riverside, 896 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1984); Haile 
v. Village of Sag Harbor, 639 F. Supp. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1986). 
 98. 1992-NMSC-026, 830 P.2d 145. 
 99. Id. ¶¶ 1, 10. 
 100. Id. ¶¶ 27–28 (noting that “[n]either reason nor justice suggests that such retribution should be 
visited upon the shoulders of blameless or unknowing taxpayers” (citing Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 
453 U.S. 247, 267 (1981))). 
 101. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-19(D) (2007). 
 102. Newport, 453 U.S. at 271. 
 103. Certainly, one could argue that a governmental entity would be less likely to commit a violation 
of someone’s rights if the entity could be exposed to punitive damages. But the issue here is not the 
commission of a tort by a governmental entity, but by one of its employees. Even if the conduct could be 
directly attributed to the governmental employer (but certainly not in the case of the police department 
that employed Garcia), there can be no real claim that the government acted with malice. The United 
States Supreme Court considered the question whether an award of punitive damages against a 
government might have a deterrent effect, and concluded it was “far from clear” that it would. Instead, 
the court suggested that corrective action, such as the discharge of the public officials who were involved 
and the public excoriation of those who were elected, would follow. Id. at 269. As the Court noted, “The 
more reasonable assumption is that responsible superiors are motivated not only by concern for the public 
fisc but also by concern for the Government’s integrity.” Id. at 269 (quoting Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 
14, 21 (1980)). The Court also noted a more effective means of deterrence – an award of punitive damages 
against the offending official. Id. at 269–70. The Court said that awarding punitive damages against the 
offending official provides sufficient protection against the prospect that an official will commit recurrent 
violations, and that the threat of such an award against the individual is more effective as a deterrent than 
the threat of punitive damages against the governmental employer. Id. If anything, the TCA, by requiring 
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implies, punitive—such an award against a government serves only to punish 
taxpayers. 
VI. USING TAXPAYER MONEY TO PAY PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
AWARDED AS A RESULT OF WHOLLY PERSONAL CONDUCT 
VIOLATES THE ANTI-DONATION CLAUSE OF THE NEW MEXICO 
CONSTITUTION 
a. The New Mexico Constitution Prohibits Expenditure of Taxpayers’ 
Monies for Private Purposes. 
The New Mexico Constitution prohibits the use of taxpayers’ monies for 
private purposes,104 except in certain, narrowly defined, circumstances which are 
inapplicable here.105 The “anti-donation clause” of the New Mexico Constitution 
provides: 
Neither the state, nor any county, school district, or 
municipality . . . shall directly or indirectly lend or pledge its credit 
or make any donation to or in aid of any person, association or 
public or private corporation. . . . 106 
There are a number of reported cases involving the interpretation of this 
constitutional provision and many opinions from the Attorney General on this 
provision. The cases and Attorney General opinions are in accord that the 
government may not use taxpayers’ money for anything unless the government 
receives fair value in return.107 
An early application of the anti-donation clause can be found in State ex. 
rel. Mechem v. Hannah.108 The State had been facing a severe drought, resulting in 
a very limited, and very expensive, supply of hay for cattle. The federal government 
interceded, and offered a program that would help pay for hay, provided that New 
Mexico would also contribute financially. The state legislature passed an 
appropriations bill, authorizing a contribution to the program that would have 
provided hay—or, at least, money for hay—to New Mexico ranchers. The Governor, 
relying on an opinion from the Attorney General, refused to allow the money to be 
provided,109 and a lawsuit ensued. 
 
that the government pay the award of punitive damages in the first instance, removes the immediate threat 
of assessing punitive damages against the governmental employee. 
 104. N.M. CONST. art. IX, § 14. 
 105. Id. (explaining that public monies may be used to provide care for the sick and indigent, to provide 
scholarships for veterans at post-secondary institutions, to create new job opportunities by buying land, 
buildings or infrastructure to support new or expanding businesses under certain circumstances, or to pay 
for land for affordable housing). 
 106. Id. 
 107. See Indemnification Under the Educational Retirement Act, N.M. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 10-05, 
2010 WL 5113294 (Dec. 2010); Public Funding in Defense of Alleged Misconduct in Public Schools, 
N.M. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 07-03, 2007 WL 2143020 (July 2007); Insurance for Criminal Defense 
Expenses, N.M. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 85-23, 1985 WL 190691 (Sept 1985). 
 108. 1957-NMSC-065, 314 P.2d 714. 
 109. Id. ¶ 1. 
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The case reached the New Mexico Supreme Court, and the Court reasoned 
that the program to provide hay by the federal government, aided by the State of New 
Mexico, “was a wonderful thing for the livestock industry, and no doubt was the 
cause of larger numbers of livestock staying on their range in New Mexico for future 
production of their kind, thus benefitting the economy of the state. . . . “110 
Nonetheless, the Court concluded that the act authorizing such a payment violated 
the anti-donation clause.111 
Absent an exception that allows the government to donate money, such as 
to the indigent,112 the New Mexico Constitution prohibits the government from 
paying money for the benefit of others, unless it also receives a corresponding 
benefit.   
b. Paying Punitive Damages for a Public Employee’s Purely Personal 
Conduct Violates the Anti-Donation Clause 
The requirement that the government pay punitive damages, at least when 
an employee’s conduct leading to the award of punitive damages was purely 
personal, violates the anti-donation clause. When the government pays punitive 
damages, the government employee who committed a tortious act benefits by being 
discharged from his or her obligation to pay damages. The plaintiff who was awarded 
damages also benefits, because he or she receives compensation greater than the 
amount necessary for any injuries. However, the government does not receive a 
corresponding benefit, which is required under the anti-donation clause. 
There are no reported decisions from a New Mexico court that consider this 
issue.113 An analogous issue, however, was raised in the United States District Court 
 
 110. Id. ¶ 39. 
 111. Id. ¶ 40. 
 112. The anti-donation clause does not impose an absolute ban on using taxpayers’ money without 
receiving a benefit in return. It contains a number of exceptions, which specifically allow the use of 
government funds for specific purposes. For example, Article IX, § 14 (A), allows for government monies 
to be used to help the poor and the ill: “Nothing in this section prohibits the state or any county or 
municipality from making provision for the care and maintenance of sick and indigent persons.” There 
are, however, no exceptions that would allow the government to use taxpayer money to pay an award of 
punitive damages assessed against a public employee. 
 113. This is a uniquely New Mexico problem. Since many states have constitutional provisions similar 
to New Mexico’s anti-donation clause, so it would seem that this issue would have arisen elsewhere. But 
it has not. The reason it has not arisen elsewhere may be due to the fact that the provisions in the New 
Mexico Tort Claims Act, which purport to require indemnification for punitive damages, are unique. Other 
states generally require that governmental employers indemnify their employees for compensatory 
damages, but not punitive damages, or provide for the indemnification of punitive damages only under 
circumstances where the governmental employee was truly acting in the best interests of the government. 
For example, the law in Colorado provides that a public entity shall pay for all judgments or settlements 
of claims against public employees, where the claim arose out of injuries sustained from an act or omission 
of the public employee during the performance of his duties and in the scope of his employment, “except 
where such act or omission is willful or wanton. . . . “ COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-10-110 (West 2016). 
The law in Idaho imposes on the public entity a duty to defend and indemnify its employees, but allows 
the entity to “refuse a defense or disavow and refuse to pay any judgment for its employee if it is 
determined that the act . . . included malice or criminal intent.” IDAHO CODE § 6-903(3) (2016). The law 
in Kansas provides that the governmental entity may refuse to provide a defense if the “employee acted 
or failed to act because of actual fraud or actual malice.” KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6108(c)(2) (West 2016). 
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for the District of Northern Alabama. Carr v. City of Florence dealt with a resolution 
adopted by the City of Florence, which agreed to pay, on behalf of its employees, all 
sums which the employees became legally obligated to pay because of “negligent 
and wrongful acts caused by an occurrence arising out of and in the line and scope 
of their legal duties. . . . “ 114 Several Florence police officers engaged in a nighttime 
chase and warrantless search.115 Twelve plaintiffs filed suit against a number of 
officers and governmental entities.116 The trial court entered summary judgment on 
the issue of liability against Officer Harvey, who had angrily slapped one of the 
plaintiffs during an interrogation.117 The rest of the case went to trial.118 
During the course of trial, the court granted a directed verdict in favor of 
many of the defendants.119 With the exception of Officer Harvey, the jury found in 
favor of the defendants who had not obtained a directed verdict.120 As to Officer 
Harvey, the jury awarded $100 to the plaintiff he had slapped, but no punitive 
damages.121 
The plaintiff who was slapped filed a motion for additur, arguing that he 
should have been awarded greater damages.122 He specifically complained that the 
court erred in excluding from evidence the ordinance adopted by the City of 
Florence, apparently believing that if the jury had been aware of the ordinance which 
required the City of Florence to pay any judgment, rather than the individual officer, 
it would have been more likely to award punitive damages.123 
The ordinance required the City of Florence to pay any award stemming 
from the “negligent and wrongful” acts of its officers.124 The trial court kept it out of 
evidence for a variety of reasons, most notably for its conclusion that the ordinance 
did not require the City of Florence to pay an award of punitive damages.125 The trial 
court noted that the constitution of Alabama placed limits on what the government 
could voluntarily agree to pay.126 Quoting a provision similar to the New Mexico 
anti-donation clause, the court noted that the legislature could not “grant public 
money or a thing of value in aide of, or to any individual. . . . “127 The court went on 
to note that the City’s resolution had to be read to allow for payment of its employees 
 
The law in Washington provides that the governmental employer has a duty to defend and indemnify only 
while the employee was acting in good faith. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.92.060, 4.92.070 (West 2016). 
And the law in Vermont imposes upon the government a duty to defend and indemnify except where the 
judgment results from gross negligence or willful misconduct. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5606 (2016). 
 114. 729 F. Supp. 783, 786 (N.D. Ala. 1990). 
 115. Id. at 784. 
 116. Id. at 785. 
 117. Id. at 785, 786. 
 118. Id. at 785. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 785. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 786 (explaining that plaintiff sought to introduce the ordinance after the defense lawyer 
introduced evidence showing that the police officer lacked the money to pay punitive damages). 
 124. Id. (quoting the Florence City Council Resolution adopted April 15, 1986). 
 125. Id. at 788–89. 
 126. Id. at 788 (quoting ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 94). 
 127. Id. 
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liabilities only if the conduct was both negligent and wrongful, because otherwise it 
would require the city to pay for liability arising solely from wrongful conduct. Any 
other reading, the court reasoned, would be unconstitutional. 
Citing an amendment to Alabama’s version of the anti-donation clause, 
which allows the government to spend money when the expenditure is deemed “in 
the proper corporate interest,” the court noted that while there might be a proper 
corporate purpose in defending a public employee accused of wrongdoing, “[t]here 
is a marked difference between providing the cost of defense and paying a punitive 
judgment. Any casualty insurance company would readily recognize this 
distinction.”128 
Although the decision in Carr seems to be the only case that directly 
addresses the issue, an analogous issue has been the subject of frequent litigation. A 
number of cases have dealt with the question of whether a government can properly 
pay for the legal expenses incurred by a public employee in defending themselves 
against criminal charges.129 Courts have consistently held that if the conduct 
resulting in criminal charges arose out of their public employment, the government 
can reimburse the employees for their legal expenses only if they are found not 
guilty, and they have acted in good faith.130 Otherwise, the courts agree, no public 
purpose would be served by reimbursing them for their legal expenses, and paying 
those expenses would be an unconstitutional payment.131 
Wright v. The City of Danville132 is typical of this line of cases. A group of 
people filed suit against the City and its commissioners, alleging a violation of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965.133 A proposed settlement agreement was reached when 
the commissioners agreed to a change in the form of government from a mayor-
commissioners system to a mayor-aldermen system, with aldermen elected from 
seven two-member districts. The agreement contained provisions, insisted on by the 
existing commissioners, that the existing commissioners would be appointed as 
administrators of the various departments that corresponded with their then-current 
duties as commissioners. They were guaranteed new employment in these 
 
 128. Id. at 789 (emphasis in original). 
 129. See, e.g., Lomelo v. City of Sunrise, 423 So. 2d 974 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Ellison v. Reid, 
397 So. 2d 352 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Wright v. City of Danville, 675 N.E.2d 110 (Ill. 1996); Snowden 
v. Anne Arundel Cty., 456 A.2d 380 (Md. 1983); Bowens v. City of Pontiac, 419 N.W.2d 24 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1988), overruled on other grounds by Warda v. City Council of Flushing, 696 N.W. 2d 671 (Mich. 
2005); Sonnenberg v. Farmington Twp., 197 N.W.2d 853 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972); Kroschel v. City of 
Afton, 512 N.W.2d 351 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994); Beckett v. Bd. of Supervisors, 363 S.E.2d 918 (Va. 1988). 
 130. See, e.g., Lomelo, 423 So. 2d at 977 (holding that costs of defending public official for misconduct 
charges served public purpose only because official was acquitted of charges); Reid, 397 So. 2d at 354; 
Snowden, 456 A.2d at 385 (holding that indemnity ordinance served public purpose primarily because it 
limited reimbursement to only those public officials who had successfully defended themselves against 
criminal charges); Bowens, 419 N.W.2d at 26; Sonnenberg, 197 N.W.2d at 854; Kroschel, 512 N.W.2d at 
356–57; Beckett, 363 S.E.2d at 921. 
 131. See, e.g., Lomelo, 423 So. 2d at 977; Reid, 397 So. 2d at 354; Snowden, 456 A.2d at 385; Bowens, 
419 N.W.2d at 26; Sonnenberg, 197 N.W.2d at 854; Kroschel, 512 N.W.2d at 356; Beckett, 363 S.E.2d at 
921. 
 132. 675 N.E.2d 110 (Ill. 1996). 
 133. See 42 U.S.C. §1973b (current version at 52 U.S.C. § 10303 (2014)). 
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administrative positions for three years, at salaries the commissioners would set 
themselves.134 
The State’s Attorney felt that the proposed settlement agreement was a 
conflict of interest. He issued subpoenas, requiring the commissioners to appear 
before a grand jury.135 A federal court issued an injunction, prohibiting the grand 
jury from going forward, and approved the settlement agreement. The 
commissioners then adopted a new ordinance, in keeping with the settlement 
agreement.136 In addition to the agreed-upon terms, the new ordinance provided that 
the City would pay for any legal fees that the commissioners incurred in the event 
that criminal charges were brought against them, provided only that any 
commissioner seeking indemnity had no reasonable cause to believe his conduct was 
unlawful and that the act or omission leading to the charges was within the scope of 
the office or employment.137 
After the ordinance was passed, the injunction issued by the federal court 
was dissolved. The State’s Attorney convened the grand jury, and the commissioners 
testified that they would receive personal benefit from the settlement agreement and 
ordinance, and that they never would have agreed to the settlement without the 
provisions allowing them to effectively retain their positions. The grand jury then 
indicted the members of the commission, charging them with official misconduct 
and conflict of interest. 
The federal district court again issued an injunction, reasoning that it had 
resolved the issues of the commissioner’s criminal liability when it approved the 
settlement. The federal court of appeals, however, reversed, finding that the district 
court had only determined that the City had the power to enter into the agreement, 
and did not have the power to determine that the negotiation process was valid. 
The commissioners subsequently stood trial on the criminal charges. During 
the trial, they admitted that they had no right to require that they retain their jobs as 
a condition of settling the voting rights litigation, and that they were not entitled to 
retention. All of the commissioners were found guilty of official misconduct. The 
convictions were reversed by the Illinois Court of Appeals, and then reinstated by 
the Illinois Supreme Court.138 
The commissioners incurred legal expenses of over $320,000. They filed 
suit against the City, seeking reimbursement of their legal expenses. The trial court 
summarily found that the commissioners were not entitled to reimbursement, and the 
case was appealed. The Illinois Court of Appeals reversed, finding that there were 
material issues of fact that should be addressed by the trial court.139 The Illinois 
Supreme Court then granted the City’s petition to appeal to the state’s highest court. 
The Illinois Constitution has a clause (similar to the anti-donation clause 
found in New Mexico’s constitution) which provides that public funds may be 
expended only for a public purpose.140 The Illinois Supreme Court noted that a state 
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 137. Id. at 114 (quoting Danville, Ill. Ordinance no. 7237 (effective Mar. 10, 1987)). 
 138. Id. at 113–14. 
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statute provided that local governments could indemnify their employees for 
compensatory damage awards and for costs in civil actions, but that they could not 
indemnify against an award of punitive damages.141 It also noted that defraying the 
costs of purely private litigation has “always been outside the bounds of a proper 
public purpose.”142 Finally, it noted that while a legislative body has broad discretion 
in determining what constitutes a public purpose, that discretion is not unlimited, and 
the courts should intervene when public property is devoted to a private purpose.143 
The court also reviewed cases involving the same issue: whether public 
money could be used to pay for the attorneys’ fees incurred by public employees 
whilst defending themselves from criminal charges. The court summarized the cases 
succinctly and accurately: 
[I]t is generally held . . . that a valid public purpose exists only 
when the authority of the municipality is limited to the 
reimbursement of legal expenses incurred in a successful 
defense.144 
After reviewing the case law concerning the use of public monies to pay for 
attorneys’ fee incurred by public employee, the court concluded that the City would 
obtain no benefit from paying for the attorneys’ fees: 
Further, the purpose of indemnification, so as not to inhibit capable 
individuals from seeking public office, has no relevance in the 
context of the criminal conduct involved in this case. No official 
of public government should be encouraged to engage in criminal 
acts by the assurance that he will be able to pass defense costs on 
to the taxpayers of the community he was elected to serve.145 
Wright v. City of Danville is not an aberration, but instead reflects the 
mainstream of reported decisions: Using taxpayers’ money to pay for attorneys’ fees 
incurred by public employees who are then convicted of a crime serves no public 
purpose, and therefore it is unconstitutional. 
The parallel between cases involving punitive damages against a public 
employee for purely personal conduct and cases involving attorneys’ fees incurred 
in the unsuccessful defense against criminal charges is patent. In both cases, the 
public employee is subject to liability because of personal conduct that is markedly 
different from the type of act he was authorized to perform, or that was performed 
purely in his own self-interest. 
The courts of New Mexico have never had the occasion to address this 
question. But the issue has repeatedly arisen, as is evidenced by several requests to 
the New Mexico Attorney General, asking for advice on the topic. And in their 
formal opinions, our Attorneys General have followed the mainstream of cases, 
concluding that paying for a public employee’s legal fees associated with criminal 
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charges would violate the anti-donation clause unless the employee is acquitted, and 
was acting in good faith.146 
1983-1986 Opinion of the Attorney General 425 
In 1985, the Attorney General was asked to opine as to whether the State 
could pay for attorney’s fees incurred by public employees in connection with 
criminal charges brought against them.147 The Attorney General noted that there was 
no statutory authority for the government to pay such fees, but noted that a number 
of other states had statutes allowing for the payment of criminal defense fees, subject 
to a number of conditions.148 The opinion also noted that in some jurisdictions, courts 
had allowed the payment of such fees even in the absence of statutory authority, 
again subject to some conditions.149 Finally, the opinion noted that some courts had 
held that the government could not voluntarily pay such fees.150 
The Attorney General framed the question as one involving the effect of the 
anti-donation clause. The opinion discussed Montgomery v. Collins151, a decision by 
the Alabama Supreme Court. The question in that case was whether the government 
could pay the attorney’s fees incurred by three police officers.152 The three officers 
had testified before a grand jury, resulting in an indictment.153 An order was entered 
enjoining the City of Montgomery (who had employed the police officers) from 
spending municipal funds in the defense of the criminal charges against the police 
officer. . 154 The Alabama Supreme Court held that because of the conclusive effect 
of conviction might have in subsequent civil litigation, the government had an 
interest in providing the employees with a defense in the criminal case, and paying 
the fees would not violate Alabama’s anti-gratuity clause.155 
The Attorney General’s opinion also states that, given the absence of 
statutory authority in New Mexico for the payment of such fees, it was the Attorney 
General’s opinion that paying the fees would not violate the anti-donation clause if: 
1. The criminal charges arose from the discharge of an official duty in which 
the government had an interest; 
2. The employee had acted in good faith when the alleged criminal conduct 
occurred; 
3. The agency seeking to indemnify the employee had the express or implied 
power to do so; 
4. The employee is exonerated of the criminal charges; and 
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5. The decision to pay the fees was be made by an impartial official or official 
body which performed a thorough investigation to determine the existence 
of the first four factors.156 
Opinion of the Attorney General 07-03 
A similar question was presented to the Attorney General in 2007. 
Specifically, the Attorney General was asked to opine as to whether public funds 
could be used to pay for legal fees incurred by public employees in legal actions filed 
against them.157 The Attorney General referred to the 1985 Opinion Letter, and noted 
that there were no significant changes in the law since that time.158 The 2007 opinion 
repeated the five criteria quoted above, and noted that while the 1985 opinion dealt 
with fees associated with criminal charges, similar criteria should be used in civil 
proceedings.159 The Attorney General emphasized the importance that the employee 
acted in good faith and was exonerated: 
The requirements that the allegations arise from conduct within the 
public employee’s official capacity or scope of employment and 
that the employee be exonerated ensure that public funds are not 
improperly used to provide a defense in personal proceedings.160 
That the employee was exonerated seems to be important; it not only 
appears in the list of criteria, but was specifically referred as a requirement for the 
expenditure of public funds.161 For example, the Attorney General cited as support 
for his position the opinion of the Attorney General of New York in a similar case, 
specifically quoting that opinion’s statement that “[a] municipality’s ‘payment of 
legal fees when an employee is found guilty would constitute an unconstitutional gift 
of public funds because an employee acting criminally is not acting within the scope 
of his public employment.’”162 
Opinion of the Attorney General 10-05 
Bruce Malott, the former chairman of the Education Retirement Board for 
the State of New Mexico, was named as a defendant in four separate lawsuits.163 He 
was the target of an investigation instituted by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, and he was being investigated by a federal grand jury.164 Risk 
Management assigned counsel to represent him in the two lawsuits, and the 
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Educational Retirement Board offered to provide him with counsel, at its expense, 
to defend him in the lawsuits, but Malott chose to hire counsel of his choice.165 He 
then demanded that the State reimburse him for his legal expenses.166 
The Attorney General opined that while the State had a duty to provide 
Malott an attorney in the two civil lawsuits, it had done so.167 It had no duty to pay 
for Malott’s private counsel. Malott argued that the attorneys provided by the State 
were insufficient, because they would not protect his “individual, personal 
interests.”168 The Attorney General, however, noted that the State could not provide 
a defense in a proceeding implicating Malott’s personal, individual interest without 
violating the anti-donation clause.169 
The State did not offer an attorney to represent Malott in connection with 
the grand jury investigation.170 In response to Malott’s claim that he was entitled to 
be indemnified for expenses associated with the criminal investigation, the Attorney 
General again reviewed the 1985 opinion, reciting the five criteria noted above.171 
The Attorney General focused on the fourth criterion, the requirement that the 
employee be exonerated of the criminal charge before the State could reimburse the 
employee for his legal expense: 
As applied to the ERB, the fourth criterion — the employee’s 
exoneration — is most critical. As discussed in this Office’s 
previous opinions, the exoneration requirement ensures that public 
funds are not improperly used to defend a public employee or 
officer who is convicted of a crime. Criminal acts, by definition, 
are not within the scope of an officer’s public duties or 
employment. 172 
In support of this position, the Attorney General cited to Wright v. City of 
Danville,173 the decision by the Illinois Supreme Court discussed at the outset of this 
section. And in Wright, the court noted that: 
[H]olding public officials personally liable for the expenses 
incurred in unsuccessfully defending charges of their criminal 
misconduct in office tends to protect the public and to secure 
honest and faithful service by such servants. Indeed, allowing 
expenditure of public funds for such use would encourage a 
disregard of duty and place a premium upon neglect or refusal of 
public officials to perform the duties imposed upon them by law.174 
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As noted by the court in Bowling v. Brown, “to reimburse [convicted public 
officials] for their legal expenses would not encourage the ‘faithful and courageous 
discharge of duty on the part of public officials.’ On the contrary, it would encourage 
the reverse.”175 No court should give any incentive to an individual “drawn to these 
corrupt practices” by promising indemnification.176 
VII. CONCLUSION 
While it certainly makes sense to provide for the defense and 
indemnification of public employees who are liable for compensatory damages for 
liability occasioned by their good faith efforts to discharge their duties, the Tort 
Claims Act goes too far when it requires the government to indemnify its employees 
for punitive damages stemming from their wholly personal and malicious objectives. 
Not only is such indemnification bad policy, it also violates the anti-donation clause 
of the New Mexico Constitution. While a litigant will, at some point, bring this issue 
to the New Mexico Supreme Court, it is likely that governments will use taxpayers’ 
money to settle claims to avoid the potential exposure to punitive damages in the 
meantime. 
The New Mexico Legislature should avoid this needless and illegal 
expenditure of money, and save everyone involved the costs of litigating the issue, 
by simply amending the TCA to comport with the New Mexico Constitution. 
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